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Backing up into advocacy: The case of
smartphone driver distraction
Robert Rosenberger
Georgia Institute of Technology

For the last decade, I’ve been studying the topic of the driving impairment of
smartphones. While this began as an exclusively academic project, it has
increasingly compelled public engagement. One example of this came in an
opinion piece I wrote in 2018 in response to a new traffic law. I take the opportunity
here to fill out the academic backstory of this particular op-ed, reflect on how this
larger project has evolved to include an unanticipated public-facing edge, and
abstract some lessons about public writing.
Keywords: distracted driving, smartphones, hands-free, phenomenology,
postphenomenology

In the summer of 2018, the Hands-Free Georgia Act went into effect.
Where the U.S. state of Georgia had previously outlawed only handheld
texting while driving, now all handheld smartphone usage behind the
wheel would be illegal. This was a response to an urgent threat. After
decades of decline, the US was suddenly experiencing a sharp spike in
roadway fatalities (Rosenberger, 2017c). Georgia saw one of the largest
increases in the country. Driver distraction appeared to be a likely factor. I
had been writing about the topic of smartphones and distracted driving for
a decade, so it felt like a duty to comment publicly on the new policy.
Since I’m based in Atlanta, I did interviews for the Atlanta JournalConstitution and the city’s NPR radio station, and spoke at an event at
City Hall. And I wrote an op-ed for the Saporta Report, an Atlanta-based
online news site (Rosenberger, 2018). I had a two-part message: (1) the
Hands-Free Georgia Act is an important step forward; but also (2) it does
not go far enough. Drivers should not only refrain from using a handheld
smartphone. They should stop using hands-free phones too, including
hands-free phone conversation, texting, and other voice-to-text and textto-audio communication functions enabled by smartphone apps and
dashboard infotainment systems.
I would like to take the opportunity of a public scholarship report to issue a
kind of postscript to the Saporta Report piece, and to put it into the context
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of the evolution of its larger research project. When I began this line of
study, I didn’t have public outreach in mind, nor did I have much
experience with that kind of work. But this philosophical project has
increasingly compelled public engagement.
I work from the phenomenological perspective, a tradition of thought that
begins its inquiries from the deep description of human experience. This
philosophical approach specializes in drawing out our bodily interactions
with the world, the roles of habituation, and the structures of perception.
And I work in the field of philosophy of technology. So, my research often
involves the attempt to describe the experience of technology usage.
When I started this project on distracted driving, I was thinking about the
user experience of two of the most commonplace technologies of
contemporary life: the smartphone and the car. My suspicion was that a
phenomenological account might be able to bring some distinctive insights
to the issue of the driver distraction of smartphones.
Before I began, I assumed that this project would involve three main tasks:
(1) gathering up and analyzing work in phenomenology on the experience
of using the phone, (2) looking into the empirical research on smartphone
driver distraction to see what theories have already been developed there,
and (3) applying the phenomenological insights to that discussion,
perhaps by developing another theory, or perhaps by commenting on the
existing theories. But I immediately encountered two surprises. They both
presented challenges and opportunities.

Surprise #1: Prior phenomenological work was thin
I didn’t find much on telephone usage in the phenomenological literature.1
So, a first part of this line of research has been to develop my own
account of the experience of using the phone. I turned to my home-base
theoretical perspective, “postphenomenology,” which builds on Don Ihde’s
corpus of work to develop practical tools for describing human-technology
relations.2 Postphenomenology pulls together ideas from the
phenomenological canon, American pragmatism, and Science &
Technology Studies to offer a framework of concepts for drawing out and
articulating our experiences with technology. But I found even this
perspective to require amendments in order to capture the aspects of the
experience of phone usage that I was after.
1

There have been some exceptions, of course. A few of the phenomenological studies of
phone usage that have been helpful to my thinking include (Backhaus, 1997; Richardson,
2007; Wellner, 2016).
2 For some introductory works on postphenomenology, see: Ihde, 2009; Rosenberger &
Verbeek, 2015; Aagaard, 2016.
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For example, the postphenomenological framework, building directly on
the work of Martin Heidegger and Maurice Merleau-Ponty, is useful for
describing the ways in which aspects of a technology may withdraw into
the background of our awareness as we become focused more on what
we are using the device to do. In Ihde’s terminology, one main way that
this kind of experience occurs is in terms of technological “embodiment.”
That is, in this form of human-technology relation, the user’s bodily
awareness is extended through the device (e.g., 2009, p. 42). For
example, if someone “knows how to drive,” then they do not only possess
information in their brain about which aspects of the car’s interface (the
steering wheel, the pedals, etc.) do what, they have been trained to drive
the car. And they have come to embody the car’s interface with what Ihde
calls a high degree of “transparency” (e.g., 2009, p. 42). The driver pays
active attention to the road. As they do this, the steering wheel and pedals
often instead become somewhat transparent, withdrawing into the
background of what is present to that driver. Good driving calls for a
transparently embodied relationship with many aspects of the car. You’ve
got to be more explicitly aware of the road ahead than the steering wheel
in your hands.
Phone usage can be similar. When one is engrossed in phone
conversation, the phone itself is embodied and can at times take on a
considerable degree of transparency. The phone in-hand can withdraw
into the background of awareness even as it makes possible that
conversation with a far-away interlocutor.
However, the transparency of the phone itself is not the most important
aspect of the phenomenology of phone usage. We need to find a way to
describe what it means to be “on the phone,” to have our experience
captured by it, to be engrossed in its usage, to have an immersive phonemediated interaction with another person. To do this, I have developed
some conceptual expansions of the postphenomenological framework. I
suggest that alongside a notion like “transparency,” we should also
consider other ways that some human-technology relations may more
radically reorganize our overall awareness.3 If, for example, I’m absorbed
in a book, we might describe much of my “field of awareness” to be
occupied or taken up by the content of what I’m reading. We can think of a
3

Classical phenomenologist Aron Gurwitsch provides some broad inspiration here, with
his language of the “organization” of the “field of consciousness” (1964). For an
introduction to my framework of concepts around the field of awareness see
Rosenberger, 2017b, and for their application to the topic of e-reading, see Rosenberger,
2017a.
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person’s technologically-mediated field of awareness as the totality of
things they are aware of within a given moment, in part shaped by their
relationships with technology. A driver, for example, maintains a complex,
shifting, and yet highly specific field of awareness that includes the
roadway ahead, a whole-body sensation of the car on the road, the audio
perception of relevant traffic sounds, and shifting levels of engagement
with things like dashboard readouts and the content of mirrors.
I suggest too that for someone that has a long-developed relationship with
a device, these aspects of experiential organization (e.g., what becomes
transparent, what is explicitly present, and how their entire field of
awareness is composed) may become associated with bodily-perceptual
habits. Pulling from the history of phenomenology, we can refer to this as
“sedimentation.” A relationship to a particular device might be more or less
sedimented, more or less automatic, immediate, and stubborn. For
example, we can imagine how difficult it would be for an experienced
driver if we were to suddenly switch around the interface of their usual car,
say, by swapping the locations of the gas and brake pedals. Sure, this
driver would eventually adjust to the new configuration. But there would be
some difficulty. Importantly, not only would this person need to learn the
new functions of the old pedals, they would additionally need to unlearn
the previous pedal arrangement. They’d need to retrain themselves to
resist the urge to stomp the old brake pedal when it is time to stop. The
difficulty this person would face in resisting that urge is a reflection of the
depth of the sedimentation of their relationship to the car. These notions of
sedimentation and the field of awareness have found use in a variety of
other research projects, including studies on video chat, classroom
distraction, e-reading, online values, facial prostheses, dance training, and
virtual reality (e.g., Spicer, 2014; Aagaard, 2015; Rosenberger, 2017a;
Susser, 2017; Yaron et al., 2017; Kapasali, 2019; Kerruish, 2019).
My suggestion is that we should think about our relations to the phone in
these terms. When someone is immersed in phone usage—e.g., absorbed
in conversation over the phone—it is not merely the case that the phone in
hand may become experientially transparent. We could also say that the
phone conversation steps forward and even comes to compose much of
our field of awareness. The practical entirety of that which the phone user
is aware in a given moment may be overtaken by the experience of the
content of the conversation and the presence of their interlocutor. It is
possible to imagine someone in a normal and uneventful situation—say,
standing alone in a familiar room—that becomes immersed in phone
conversation such that they experience a greatly diminished situational
awareness, barely noticing their immediate surroundings. I contend that
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for the average smartphone user today, for whom the device is a normal
and always present companion, these structures of immersive awareness
are highly sedimented.

Surprise #2: Prior empirical work was theoretically
underdeveloped
There was not already a bustling theoretical discussion within the
empirical research. These scientists were hard at work proving that things
like texting and talking on the phone are very dangerous to do while
driving. Texting was turning out to present by far the biggest hazard (e.g.,
Drews et al., 2009; Yager, 2012; and for a meta-analysis of studies, see:
Caird et al., 2014). But talking on the phone too has been shown to be
associated with a significant drop in driving performance, and this goes
equally for using a handheld and hands-free phone conversation (for a few
examples of literature reviews and meta-analyses of this voluminous body
of research, see: McCartt et al., 2006; Ishigami & Klein, 2009; Lipovak et
al., 2017; Caird et al., 2018).4 In addition to the simulator and test-track
data that reveal associations between driving mistakes and phone usage,
the epidemiological research (i.e., studies that contrast phone records with
other data such as hospital and police reports) show phone conversation
to increase the danger of driving by three to four times (e.g., Redelmeier &
Tibshirani, 1997; McEvoy et al., 2005; Elvik, 2011). Phone usage even
bears comparison to drunk driving (e.g., Strayer et al., 2006; Leung et al.,
2012). Studies are beginning to also show that hands-free text
communication, such as texting or emailing through voice-to-text
smartphone apps, can be even more dangerous than handheld texting,
especially when the programs are prone to error (e.g., Yager, 2013;
Strayer et al., 2014).
Although this has changed somewhat since I first began studying this
topic, the empirical discussion on smartphones and distracted driving is
flush with data but comparatively thin on theory, an exciting situation for a
theorist like me. However, while only a minority of the papers in this
discussion are doing explicit theory work, there does appear to be an
implicit account reflected in the ways in which some of them report their
findings. The data are largely behavioral (e.g., observed stopping
distances). Yet, concluding sections of these articles sometimes report on
the observation of a lack of “cognitive resources,” or “information
processing power,” or “attention” required to safely perform the two tasks
of driving and using the phone at the same time. As a phenomenologist,
4

One important line of research that provides some disconfirmatory evidence is the incab camera naturalistic studies (e.g., Dingus et al., 2016).
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this kind of language jumps off the page at me since it reflects a different
basic understanding of the mind from my own theoretical outlook. It does
not scan to me as an innocent or obvious description of the data. It reads
as an implicit theoretical account.
Truth be told, I think my main contribution to the empirical research is
actually the basic observation that this discussion maintains a default
theory, namely the theory that the driving impairment of smartphones is
ultimately due to our inherently limited cognitive resources. According to
this view, we simply cannot multitask well enough to safely drive and talk
on the phone at once. Such a theory helps to address why not only
handheld, but also hands-free phones, result in driving performance
decrements. When a driver talks on a hands-free phone, they can keep
eyes forward and hands on the wheel, so the resulting danger cannot
stem simply from the act of looking away from the road. According to this
account, hands-free phone usage causes impaired driving because of its
mental taxation. My suggestion is that the more specific theories offered
within this literature—such as the idea of a “resource bottleneck,” or that
drivers experience “inattention blindness”—are subspecies of this larger
cognitive resources account.
But to really show that this cognitive account is a theory, and not merely a
description of the world as it is, I would need to develop an alternative
theory of these same data. To do so, I appealed to a
postphenomenological conception of sedimentation and technology’s
capacity to reorganize a user’s field of awareness. It is essential to note
that I do not disagree with these scientists about the results that show
people to be very bad at driving while using the phone. And, I agree with
those empirical researchers who conclude that smartphone driving
impairment is a pressing public problem that must be addressed. My
disagreement is over exactly how it is that smartphone usage results in
poorer driving performance. The tricky part in developing an alternative
theory would be the attempt to describe this phenomenon without any
reference to cognitive processes, resource quantities, metaphors to
computing, or any kind of mechanistic conception of the human mind. As
explanatory actors go, it would be best if I could leave the brain out of it
entirely.
The alternative account of the data on smartphone driving impairment I’ve
proposed, including the distraction of hands-free phones, goes like this:
when immersed in phone usage, the driver’s field of awareness can
become largely composed by the content of that phone relation, and they
can fail to perceive their immediate surroundings. This relation to the
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phone is often associated with considerable sedimentation, so the driver
may at times be pulled into an organization of awareness focused upon
the world opened up by the phone. Put more plainly, due to longdeveloped habits, a driver may be inclined at times to become occupied
more by the conversation taking place over the phone than on the road
ahead. A driver may even attempt to maintain active concentration on both
the phone conversation and the driving, and this may work for a time. But,
perhaps when the driving becomes dull or the conversation becomes
engaging, those habits of perception may come creeping in and pull the
driver’s attention away from the road and into a field of awareness
organized mostly around the person on the other end of the line.
After initially proposing my account of the phenomenology of smartphone
conversation and its application to the distracted driving research
(Rosenberger, 2010, 2012), I applied these ideas to a variety of subtopics
within this discussion. These include the issue of passenger distraction
(which is not always as dangerous as the phone, Rosenberger, 2019),
dashboard infotainment systems and hands-free texting (Rosenberger,
2013a, 2013b, 2015), wearable computing (Rosenberger, 2104b, 2015),
and the implications of automated vehicles (Rosenberger, forthcoming).5

Backing up into advocacy
In this way, the project has been a somewhat typical line of academic
research, albeit an interdisciplinary one, and one with at least two potential
audiences. The first is those who may be interested in the science of
distracted driving. The second is the postphenomenological researchers
who may be interested in the new conceptual tools (e.g., the “field of
awareness,” “sedimentation” as a factor in technology usage) coming out
of the exploration of this case.
However, I soon came to realize that there was another, more important
audience that I should be attempting to reach. This project was essentially
an attempt to describe driver distraction in new ways. As such, my work
could have some utility in communicating this problem to the public.
Perhaps the theoretical account I am developing could inform the
language used in persuading people that these dangers are real. I should
be trying to leverage my place as a professional researcher on this topic to
create ways to get the word out.

5

For a philosophical debate over these issues, see the 18(2-3), 2014 special issue of the
journal Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology.
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I’ve been doing this public-facing work so far mainly through participation
in media coverage of this topic, and through writing op-eds in for-thepublic venues. For example, I’ve published a series of pieces in Slate
magazine online, covering topics such as the tragic repeal of the first
citywide ban of handheld electronics while driving in the US, and recent
industry lobbying for less restrictive government dashboard infotainment
system design recommendations (e.g., Rosenberger, 2014a, 2017c). The
media relations department at the university where I work has been helpful
in the development of a press release and other forms of press contact
that have informed reporters about my academic work. This has provided
opportunities to synopsize my views for the public in print and on the
radio. And when a separate project of mine went viral—a related study
about “phantom vibration syndrome” (that thing when you feel your phone
vibrate in your pocket although it didn’t actually vibrate)—I did my best to
turn that virality into opportunities to spread the word about the dangers of
smartphone driver distraction.
I’ve learned through these experiences that justifications for media
participation come in at least two varieties. The first is the straightforward
sharing of exactly the findings of your own research. Insofar as your own
work may be newsworthy, you may find the opportunity to garner media
attention, or write about it in public venues. However, if new to writing for
the general public, as I largely was when I began this project a decade
ago, then there can be some surprising challenges. The kinds of content
you can write, and the kinds of styles you can take up, for media venues
are very different from academic publishing, even when it is exactly your
own research you are writing about. As others have said before, the work
of communicating with a public audience calls for its own skillset. (Of
course media participation and op-ed writing is not the only form of publicfacing philosophical work. Nor is it necessarily the best or most effective
kind. It is simply what I have been able to do so far. Other forms will
similarly call for the development of skills that academics do not
automatically already possess.6)
The second is participation in public discussion based on your general
status as an expert on the topic. Media outlets are often open to allowing
6

Under a variety of names, there have been various, if often halting, calls over the years
for “engaged,” “activist,” “public,” and “field” philosophy and STS (e.g., Durbin, 2000;
Woodhouse et al., 2002; Bijker, 2003; Douglas, 2010; Wittkower et al., 2013; Brister &
Frodeman, 2020; Fried, forthcoming). And there are many philosophers and STS
practitioners that are simply already waist deep in the practice of doing public philosophy,
often in their own individual ways, sometimes as a part of engaged or activist
communities. I take my reflections here to be broadly consistent with themes emerging
across this kind of work.
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you to opine about the general aspects of a topic based on your status as
someone who has published something—anything—academic on some
specific aspect of that topic. So, for example, my piece in the Saporta
Report last year has a flash or two of the postphenomenological
perspective on smartphone driving impairment I’ve developed. But it is
mainly a rundown on my general, albeit informed, opinions on the topic.
My license to drop those opinions—i.e., my status as a recognized
expert—comes from my documented participation in the academic work,
as well as my university position. I’ve parlayed my highly restricted
philosophical theorizing about driver distraction into the authorization to
write in media outlets about this topic in a way that is widely ranging,
punchy, and which draws on the cognitive language whenever useful.
There are several reasons why the issue of smartphone driver distraction
in particular is something that deserves activist engagement with the
public. Since the scientific findings show this behavior to be both
dangerous and pervasive, it is of course straightforwardly important to get
the word out about these dangers. However, the problem of smartphone
driver distraction calls for more than merely raising awareness.
Addressing this problem calls for more than merely the task of making
information available. An appeal to the public must be made. We must get
through to people. I see at least three reasons for this charge. And in the
case of these kinds of challenges, philosophy can have a special role to
play.

Communicating risk
For one, it is possible that developing a variety of languages for
communicating the dangers of driver distraction will be helpful for creating
messages that resonate with more people. Beyond the data themselves,
the notion of “cognitive distraction” has been one of the most important
things to come out of the empirical research. The idea is that handheld
texting and phone usage involves both the “manual distraction” of failing to
hold the steering wheel with both hands, and the “visual distraction” of
taking your eyeballs off the road. Although hands-free smartphone usage
doesn’t involve either of those forms of distraction, it is still dangerously
distracting. This is because, like handheld phone conversation too, handsfree phone usage results in cognitive distraction. It’s a powerful and
relatively simple argument. And over the last decade and a half, the
language of cognitive distraction has found its way into the literature of
organizations such as the National Safety Council, the American
Automotive Association, the Center for Disease Control, and the World
Health Organization.
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However, it appears that not all drivers are convinced by this line of
reasoning. Additional concepts and arguments may be helpful. Emotional
appeals are sometimes made, providing the awful details of cases of
distracted driving deaths. A language of addiction is also sometimes taken
up in consciousness raising efforts. The idea is that if you’re addicted to
using your phone, then you cannot trust yourself to use it responsibly, and
you should just put it away entirely when driving.
In addition to all these, the postphenomenological account I’ve been
developing may offer some of its own distinct advantages in
communicating these dangers. From the phenomenology, we can abstract
a language of habituation. The pull of smartphone communication into
distraction is one that comes with the force of a “bad habit.” It is possible
that some drivers are resistant to activist efforts that rely on cognitive or
addiction vocabularies because they do not see any evidence that they
themselves are experiencing a cognitive deficit or an addictive
dependence. This is exactly where bad habit metaphors may be effective.
Habits often function surreptitiously, enacting influence in a way that can
be difficult to notice. And overturning bad habits requires not only
confidence in your own will power, but active effort put toward unlearning
them. Even if you are sure that you are neither cognitively impaired by
your phone, nor addicted to it, you may be open to the possibility that
you’ve developed some bad habits. Perhaps these ideas will be
persuasive to some drivers.

Countering bias
Second, here’s what I believe to be the most important set of empirical
findings on smartphones and distracted driving: people are extremely poor
judges of their own level of smartphone-induced driving impairment.
Drivers cannot be counted on to make reliable assessments of how
distracted they are by the phone (e.g., Horrey et al., 2008; Sanmonbatsu
et al., 2016; Terry & Terry, 2016). There’s some indication that many
drivers even recognize smartphone distraction to be a serious danger, and
yet at the same time each see themselves to be a specific exception to
that pattern. This is why efforts to educate the public must go beyond
simple communication of the dangers. A variety of communication and
argument strategies may be necessary since some drivers—including
some of the most confident ones—are specifically underestimating their
own level of impairment.
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Counter-messaging
There’s a third reason that efforts to convince the public about the dangers
of using a smartphone while driving must go beyond mere education: the
public is constantly receiving messaging to the contrary. It is in the
economic interest of several business sectors, including the automotive
industry and the telecommunications industry, that drivers not refrain too
much from using smartphones while behind the wheel. Quite a lot of
investment has been put into hands-free smartphone applications and
personal assistant programming, as well as dashboard infotainment
systems that pair with your phone. There’s been a marketing push for
these “connectivity features.” When it comes to hands-free smartphone
applications—including texting, calling, email, social media, apps, and
dashboard functionality—there is money on the line. Drivers are potential
customers. In the attention economy, drivers are an important market.
Representatives from these industries actively lobby government officials
to limit legal restrictions. It is true that some in these industries actively
discourage drivers from engaging in handheld texting while driving, and
this is important. Yet, these efforts can also be interpreted to exclusively
attack the very most distracting activity while at the same time actively
promoting other distracting behaviors.
Also, consider the laws like the handheld statewide texting bans that have
proliferated across the US, as well as handheld smartphone bans like the
Hands-Free Georgia Act that are beginning to appear. By outlawing only
handheld phone usage, and specifically failing to restrict hands-free
usage, drivers are sent the message that hands-free smartphone usage
should be encouraged. The public-facing work of scientists and other
activists against distracted driving cannot be understood to be merely an
effort to provide an important message; it must be understood as a form of
counter-messaging.
Ultimately, I hope we can abstract some useful things from my experience
of slowly and awkwardly backing into public engagement on the issue of
distracted driving. I certainly have learned much myself. I now approach
my ongoing work on other topics differently. Of course, much of what I do,
such as developing postphenomenological theory, still falls mainly in the
category of traditional academic research. But as I engage in each new
research effort, I am now on the lookout for how any project might have
public applications. For example, when my current work on homelessness
and the politics of public space came to take on a publicly relevant
character, I was ready to act, and had already refined some of the relevant
skills.

Published by ODU Digital Commons, 2020

11

The Journal of Sociotechnical Critique, Vol. 1, Iss. 1 [2020], Art. 3

Public discussion on urgent and important topics requires experts not only
to raise awareness of their research findings. They may need to do more
than merely comment or weigh in. They may need to philosophize. That is,
they may need to bring philosophy to bear on public discussions to urge
people to think about topics in different ways, through different arguments,
different conceptual frameworks, and different language.
Anyway, don’t use your smartphone while driving.
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